Firstly, after decades of sporadic sessions, annual sessions of parliament now met, usually from October to April, dovetailing well with the regular summer sessions of the Scottish Parliament. Secondly, there was a huge increase in the amount of legislation passed, feeding of course on the regularity of sessions, and this resulted in an unprecedented number of standing orders to fine-tune the procedures of the house in order to cope with the greater level of activity. Committees became more structured and specialised in response to the new level of business, although mostly based on existing models. Lastly, and also made possible by the regular sessions, the Commons took the opportunity to regulate and agree Crown finances on an annual basis, indicating that the key change in the balance of power between
Crown and Parliament was actually an extension of the familiar control of taxation English monarchs had lived with since the fourteenth century. Indeed, many of the procedural changes associated with the post 1689 period, such as recourse to 'appropriation' or hypothecation of tax for a specific purpose, say for the navy, were prefigured under Charles While nobles were very anxious to take their place in Parliament and the Articles, as privy councillors they were not necessarily active members of the administration. 18 Nonetheless, the resemblance between Council and Articles was especially close in the reigns of Charles II and James VII. Also, Rait and others proclaim that, from the 1580s until 1633, the time available for debate before the whole house was ostensibly reduced to a few days as parliament met merely to rubber-stamp the legislative programme formulated by the government and the Articles. The case for royal authoritarianism seems unassailable and so follows the historiographical justification for revolutionary attacks on the Articles in 1640
and 1689-90.
There is, nonetheless, a revisionist case for more gradual constitutional change and for the relative independence of the Articles. Firstly, from the 1570s the Articles expanded from the medieval committee of between nine and eighteen people to about forty, even though before this some committees of thirty or so met occasionally, as in 1488 and 1535. The Articles was therefore a large committee, on average representing twenty five per cent of the full sederunt or parliamentary roll from 1603 to 1707, and with a composition that necessarily produced some diversity of opinion. 19 Research on multicameralism in the Scottish Parliament shows that the three or four Estates frequently met separately up to 1633, and so exercised some influence on debate and opinion within the Articles and before voting by the whole house.
Access to the Committee and advance briefing of non-committee members, before voting before the whole house, was commonplace. Also, before 1621, the king was not always able to nominate his chosen members of the Articles and even then we still find opposition within the Committee to some royal policies. 20 The conventional picture of royal control of the Articles has been greatly exaggerated, at least before Charles I's tightly managed Parliament of 1633.
After the years between 1640 and 1651, when no Committee of the Articles existed, the Restoration brought back the Committee but not the complete constitutional position at 1633 or before. In debates over committees and legalisation in 1661 and 1662 it was clearly stated that the Estates had the right to consider and approve all statutes. 21 The procedure of passing of all acts en bloc on the last day of the session -which occurred notably in 1584 and 1633, although in other instances usually after wide consultation -was clearly set aside, and acts were now more frequently 'read, voted and approven' one by one. 22 John Graham, Viscount Dundee had raised James's standard in April. 33 As the military position grew more alarming, building towards the Jacobite victory at Killiecrankie on 27
July, it is no surprise that uncommitted peers absented themselves from Parliament so delaying a decision on whether or not to co-operate with the new regime. Peers were anxious to back the winning side, the threat of forfeiture being especially calamitous. Absenteeism was as often the result of self-interest as of loyalism. 34 Debates about parliamentary reform must have seemed peculiarly obtuse to many.
What was the impact of this absenteeism? In early July it was noted in Parliament that twenty-two noblemen were absent, along with eighteen elected burgh and shire commissioners. In fact, whereas fifty-seven nobles attended the Convention, only thirty-five attended the Parliament in June and July 1689. 35 This represented a dramatic collapse in the noble interest, which conversely strengthened the voting power of the burghs and shires. The burgh and shire elections in the winter of 1688/9 had been carefully managed by the revolutionary 'party'. Both the testimony of the earl of Balcarres, though a Jacobite, and the decisions over disputed elections by the Convention's Committee for Controverted
Elections, confirm the manipulation of the electoral system to party advantage. 36 Essentially, an electoral backlash took place which eliminated efforts by King James to interfere with burgh councils. 37 In There were sound political reasons for this in the heated months of 1689. The revolutionary government sought to be as inclusive as possible and to extend patronage widely, and conversely, of course, limit the concentration of power in individuals and family interests. Tarbat and the new face Johnston were in careers, temperament and religion very different individuals. The former episcopalian and the latter presbyterian, they could barely conceal their contempt for one another. 45 Tarbat was an astonishing survivor, weak in the details of I spoke long ago to Mr Nairn to write to you (for he says it is not his work) to have the books filled up in as much as they are defective during your time. It is stranger how that came at all to be neglected and yet stranger that upon fair advertising it should not be helped. Now the King must know it. Mr Nairn has brought to me some scrolls of papers but ownes that he knows not which were originals that passed the King's hand so I am not a whitt wiser than I was. If this be his fault he may be made wiser. before the end of the year. 58 The importance placed on the accurate maintenance of parliamentary registers is seen early in 1690 when a commission was appointed to examine the registers and to obtain Tarbat's oath that he had not tampered with them. revenue, debt, trade, the church, the militia and the courts. 67 More general instructions were given to him for the sessions of 1670 and 1672, and those for 1673, though appearing to be detailed, relate almost exclusively to conventicles and military matters. 68 Significantly in the administrations of Lauderdale the concept of private and public instructions had evolved. Clerk being always present at the adjusting of the minutes before publication. This had been prefigured a week or so before, when it was reiterated that the minutes should be signed by the Chancellor; agreed that they would only contain details of the acts and ordinances of Parliament, and lastly decided that each day's minutes would be read at the next sederunt. Tarbat's reputation for maladministration had already been further tarnished a few days before. Not only had Tarbat issued an order in the name of Parliament 'which order they never gave' concerning a private process, but alse he had been repeatedly found to have '[falsified] the minutes'. Indeed, months later the Privy Council was still authorising the reprinting of minutes from specific days from the 1693 session. 93 The Estates themselves were so appalled at his behaviour that 'it was only to prevent noise that he was not suspended from his office'. 94 Tarbat to recall all offending copies and to reprint replacements at his own cost. When he eventually offered to resign the Clerk Registry in 1695 it must have been a great relief to many. 96 However, Tarbat remained an important political figure and his administrative abilities always appeared in inverse proportion to his perceived status as a political heavyweight.
Johnston's project for administrative reform arose from many motives but it was nonetheless of enormous significance and set the tone for the reforming agenda from 1693. He supported the proliferation of regular session committees that arose after 1689 whereby all matters came back to the full house, and Johnston was happy enough with the idea that business was carried out in plain or full parliament after 1702. Yet the reforms he initiated outlived the changes of 1700-3 which saw the demise of most committees. In 1695 acts were regularly to 'lie on the table' enabling a pause in the legislative process for drafts acts and overtures to be scrutinised. 97 In 1696 the procedure for processing legislation was further improved by passing the printing of draft acts and the 'Act that no Law pass at first reading'. This act meant that the word 'reading' was formalised as a technical term and an act was now subject to a likely four-stage process: first reading, second or further reading, voting and then touching with the sceptre to make it law. 98 The Scottish procedure always retained a more flexible structure than the equivalent in the House of Commons but at least the reforms ensured that legislation after 1696 was subjected to the level of scrutiny one would expect from a diligent parliament. 
